That job will likely involve England left-back Nico O’Reilly. At 6ft 4in, O’Reilly is better equipped for that duel than most full-backs Norway have faced. It is still not exactly a quiet afternoon, but at least it is not a mismatch designed by a committee with a sense of humour.
Should England press man-to-man or keep cover on Haaland?
The obvious way to disrupt Norway is to press man-to-man across the pitch. That reduces their spare players in build-up and asks England’s defenders to win the direct balls when Nyland goes long. If Sørloth is the outlet, O’Reilly’s size makes that plan more credible than it might otherwise be.
The cost is clear. A full man-to-man press risks leaving Haaland isolated against one centre-back in open space. Most coaches spend quite a lot of their careers trying not to create that situation voluntarily.
The safer alternative is to keep a spare defender behind the press, usually meaning two players remain near Haaland. But that leaves England short higher up the pitch. Norway would then have at least one free player in build-up, and possibly two once Nyland’s involvement is counted.
Dropping off completely brings its own issues. Tuchel’s England have been built around a more proactive identity, so a deep, passive block would not exactly fit the recent direction of travel. More importantly, Norway have shown they can use possession as a defensive tool. Against Brazil, they were comfortable slowing the game, keeping the ball, resting with it, and making the opponent chase.
Martin Ødegaard is vital to that rhythm. He drops deep, links short passes, and helps Norway make pressure feel slightly futile. It can look low-risk to the point of being decorative, but it is effective game management.
How Brazil’s press offered England a useful template
Brazil did not solve Norway completely, but they did show some useful pressing ideas. One forward curved his run to block one side of the pitch and guide Nyland towards his left. The wingers were positioned to jump onto Norway’s full-backs, while the remaining central attackers were ready to press either the holding midfielder or the free centre-back.
Even then, Nyland’s left-footed long passing was strong enough to find Sørloth with regularity. That matters for England’s planning. Forcing Nyland onto his weaker side is useful only if the next action is prepared. Otherwise, it is just a polite invitation for him to do something Norway are already comfortable doing.
A more realistic aim may be to funnel Norway into a predictable long pass and then collapse around the second ball. If England know the diagonal to Sørloth is coming, they can arrange O’Reilly, the nearest centre-back and midfield support to compete for the first contact and the loose ball.
England normally defend with a front two, often Harry Kane and Jude Bellingham. Against Norway’s three central build-up players, that alone will leave them outnumbered, much as they were against DR Congo. Tuchel could ask a midfielder, possibly Declan Rice, to step higher and join the press. That may create some untidy moments, but controlled chaos can be preferable to letting Norway control the tempo neatly.
What makes Haaland difficult to contain beyond the obvious
Stopping Haaland can mean two different things: cutting off the supply or dealing with him directly. The first is hard. The second is harder and tends to involve a centre-back discovering how long 90 minutes can feel.
When Norway move the ball high, their attacking patterns rely heavily on wide combinations and rotations. Antonio Nusa and Andreas Schjelderup have shared the left-sided role and have delivered useful service into Haaland. The space for them often comes from long underlapping runs by left-back David Møller Wolfe, who drives inside rather than simply overlapping outside.
Those runs create two problems. If tracked, they pull opposition midfielders deeper and open space for the winger to cut inside. If not tracked, Møller Wolfe can receive behind the midfield line and create from a dangerous position.
One recurring Norway route is the deep in-swinging cross to the back post. That is not a minor detail when Haaland is the target. Back-post runs are one of his three most common scoring methods, along with through balls down the left channel and cut-backs against a retreating defence.
Marc Guéhi, if selected, has direct experience of the issue. In 2024, while playing for Crystal Palace against Manchester City, he saw Matheus Nunes deliver a similar cross before Haaland peeled away at the back post and headed in. There are gentler reminders available, but football rarely chooses them.
Why crowding Haaland may be necessary, not negative
At club level, teams have occasionally reduced Haaland’s influence by surrounding him rather than simply marking him. In a 1-1 draw with West Ham last season, former Manchester City manager Pep Guardiola described the problem with typical exaggeration serving a serious point.
“Do you know how many central defenders were around [Haaland] today? 200 million. Do you know how many holding midfielders? It is the most difficult position on the planet.”
West Ham used three central defenders and kept a holding midfielder close to Haaland, often treating him as a man-marking assignment. The aim was not to win every duel cleanly, because that is an optimistic business plan. It was to limit his room, crowd the zones he wants, and reduce the quality of service.
For England, that likely means prioritising the wide areas before the cross is delivered. Doubling up on Nusa or Schjelderup could reduce the number of back-post deliveries. The problem is that doubling up may free the underlapping full-back, who can then cross instead.
Tuchel’s decision-making will probably involve Bellingham. Out of possession, England may need him to drop into a midfield five, helping the wide player and full-back while still being ready to spring forward when the ball turns over. It is demanding work, which is why tournament football keeps giving elite midfielders job descriptions with no obvious closing time.
How England can hurt Norway with the ball
England’s best defensive tool may still be possession. If they can keep the ball for sustained spells, they can push Norway back, reduce Haaland’s transition chances, and use their own wide combinations.
Tuchel’s side have similar attacking mechanisms to Norway. If England’s wide midfielder holds a deeper position, an advancing full-back can run beyond and create a two-against-one against Norway’s full-back. O’Reilly can play a version of the role Møller Wolfe performs for Norway: underlapping to open space for the winger to come inside or receiving behind the defensive line himself.
Anthony Gordon has already shown he can drive to the byline and create cut-backs for late runners. That kind of chance is especially useful against a defence retreating towards its own goal, because it changes the direction of the attack and forces defenders to turn.
There is also a transition route. Norway can leave fewer players behind the ball when they settle into possession. Brazil did not score from open play, but they did create several high-quality chances after regaining the ball and attacking quickly into the spaces Norway had vacated.
That suits several England players. Gordon, Bellingham, Rice and Noni Madueke are all comfortable carrying or running into open grass after forcing turnovers. The key for England is balance: press enough to make Norway uncomfortable, protect enough to avoid isolating defenders against Haaland, and attack with enough precision that possession does not become sterile. Simple, then, apart from all the difficult parts.
